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In December 2000, Program Budget Decision (PBD) 096 changed the way the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) budgets for Arabian Gulf operations.  The cost of 
operations is now required to be submitted as part of the annual budget vice funded as 
contingency operations.  In order to justify increased funding of incremental costs for 
operations in the Gulf, a method to justify such budget requests must be developed.  This 
research developed a regression model targeted at the intermediate and depot level 
maintenance cost trends for Air Conditioning (A/C) systems based upon the assumption 
that the severe weather factors of the Gulf would impact the maintenance of A/C 
equipment.  The model used ship age, deployed operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and 
temperature factors as explanatory variables in the model.  The results of the regression 
analysis indicate the model does not provide evidence of increased maintenance costs of 
A/C systems for operations in the Gulf.  Based on the inconsistencies in the maintenance 
data and the limitations of the explanatory variables, it is recommended that this approach 
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I. BACKGROUND/INTRODUCTION  
A. ARABIAN GULF OPERATIONS 
Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States has conducted ongoing 
operations in the Arabian Gulf to enforce United Nations (U.N.) sanctions against Iraq, 
ensure stability in the Middle East, and protect the free flow of oil exports worldwide.  
The total reported incremental costs for Southwest Asia operations were $7.44 billion as 
of March 2000 with Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds representing the bulk of 
the contingency costs.  Until recently, the increased costs associated with these ongoing 
operations have not been included in the Department of Defense (DOD) annual budget 
approved by Congress.  They have been paid for by reprogramming and transfers, 
supplemental appropriations, or specific contingency operations accounts such as the 
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF).  Program Budget Decision 
(PBD) 096 dated 19 December 2000 has changed the way DOD budgets for operations in 
the Arabian Gulf. 
Arabian Gulf operations have continued for more than a decade and are no longer 
considered contingency operations by DOD.  PBD 096 requires costs of operations in the 
Gulf to be submitted in the regular budget cycle.  Several factors led to this decision.  In 
the past, DOD has had to reprogram or transfer money from other programs into the 
O&M account to pay for operations hoping for additional funding from Congress later in 
the year.  Additionally, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 placed budgetary caps on 
spending which has resulted in rescissions to partially fund the supplemental 
appropriations provided by Congress.  Typically, the DOD has paid for the rescissions 
with procurement and modernization funds or has cancelled end of the year training and 
maintenance.   The result of these actions has been a degradation of readiness, 
modernization, and the budget process.  Including the cost of operations in the Gulf in 
our regular budget will help the Department of the Navy (DoN) plan and execute the 
budget more efficiently.  The key will be to identify and capture the incremental costs 
associated with Arabian Gulf operations. 
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B. INCREMENTAL COSTS/RECONSTITUTION 
The DOD’s regulations prior to 2001 did not standardize the process for 
identifying incremental costs, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) Report B-
285260 dated June 2000 summarizes their concerns regarding this lack of uniformity.  
The most obvious example was the flying hour program in which the Air Force and the 
Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific fleets all had different approaches to calculate their costs for 
support of contingency operations.  [Ref. 1, p.2]  The DOD Financial Management 
Regulation (DODFMR) Volume 12, Chapter 23 dated February 2001 has standardized 
the guidelines for identifying and requesting funding for Contingency Operations, but not 
the process for calculating the costs.  By regulation, the DOD is limited to claiming only 
the incremental costs of the operation, which are above the normal baseline for training, 
operations, and personnel costs. [Ref. 9, p.23-6]  Baseline costs are defined as those costs 
that would have incurred regardless of the contingency operation, i.e., normal budgeted 
operations. 
There are many factors that can be included to justify incremental cost estimates.  
They include:  Number of troops, Duration, Terrain/Weather, Operational Tempo 
(OPTEMPO), Reconstitution, Training, Host Nation Support, etc.  The assumptions and 
facts that apply to the cost estimates must be noted in the justification statements.  There 
are four major cost categories to justify claims:  Personnel, Personnel Support, Operating 
Support, and Transportation.  This thesis will concentrate on the category of operating 
support. 
Air conditioning (A/C) maintenance has been singled out for research because of 
the severe environment of the Arabian Gulf.  The basic laws of physics state that the 
more work it takes to cool air or water the hotter it is.  The Arabian Gulf has significantly 
hotter air and water temperatures than our other major deployment areas such as the 
Mediterranean Sea.  Therefore, its impact on A/C maintenance warrants close 
examination. 
Operating support is broken down into seven subcategories:  Training, Operation 
OPTEMPO, Other Supplies and Equipment, Facilities/Base Support, Reconstitution, 
Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence (C4I), and Other 
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Services and Miscellaneous Contracts.  The two subcategories that apply to A/C system 
maintenance are operation OPTEMPO and reconstitution.  Operation OPTEMPO 
includes the incremental costs to operate including repair parts, maintenance support, and 
the equipment maintenance required to prepare for deployment and maintain equipment 
during the operation.  For maintenance of equipment, we must identify that portion of 
equipment overhaul and maintenance costs, computed on a fractional use basis, when the 
additive cost attributable to the contingency can be identified. [Ref. 9, p.23-18]  Simply 
stated, a baseline cost estimate must be established so that incremental costs of operations 
can be identified. 
Reconstitution includes the cost to clean, inspect, maintain, replace, and restore 
equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of the contingency operation or unit 
deployment.  It covers equipment organic to the participating unit and war reserve stocks 
prior to replacement into storage.  It excludes the cost to transport equipment being 
repaired/restored.  The DODFMR’s guideline question for reconstitution states:  What 
supplies must be replaced and equipment repaired when troops and/or equipment are 
redeployed or rotated? [Ref. 9, p. 23-13] 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Documentation and justification of incremental costs present a difficult challenge 
for our budget personnel.  Numerous GAO studies have highlighted the DOD’s inability 
to standardize the process for identifying these additional costs.  This breeds mistrust by 
Congress of the reliability of our cost estimates and makes it harder for agency personnel 
to justify additional funding. 
The DODFMR Chapter 23 provides broad guidelines for justification of 
incremental costs, but not a method for calculation of these costs.  The goal of this study 
is to present a justifiable incremental cost model for A/C system maintenance associated 
with Arabian Gulf operations.  This will aid in providing better budget estimates and 
improving the credibility of requests for increased funding for our continued presence in 
the Gulf.  Also, with the start of operations in support of Enduring Freedom, this model 




























II. DATA COLLECTION AND REDUCTION 
A. AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS 
1. Equipment Identification 
Equipment onboard ship is categorized by Equipment Identification Code (EIC).  
The first number identifies the system and the first and second numbers together identify 
the equipment subsystem.  EIC T4 represents the equipment and supporting infrastructure 
for A/C systems including the A/C plants, fan coil units (FCU), and all ventilation and 
piping associated with the system.  [Ref. 7, p. A-23] 
2. Organizational Level Maintenance 
Organizational level maintenance is the lowest echelon of maintenance and is 
conducted by ship’s force personnel.  The ship’s auxiliaries and electrical divisions are 
responsible for all ship’s force level maintenance on the A/C system.  Typical 
maintenance actions include cleaning, preservation, routine maintenance and inspection, 
and preventative maintenance actions all of which occur on a continuous basis in 
accordance with the Preventative Maintenance System (PMS).  All maintenance actions 
are documented in the Current Ship’s Maintenance Project (CSMP) by regulation and the 
ship is required to keep the CSMP up to date and accurate. 
3. Intermediate Level Maintenance 
Intermediate level maintenance is for maintenance actions that are above and 
beyond the capability of ship’s force personnel.  It is normally accomplished by Navy 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (NIMA) on repair ships and aircraft carriers or at 
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA).  IMA’s perform maintenance, repair, 
overhaul, calibration, and testing functions that are beyond the capability or capacity of 
the customer.  Since the aircraft carriers are designated as NIMAs, the maintenance at the 
intermediate level will be shared by both ship’s force personnel and by personnel at the 
SIMA.  Intermediate maintenance is conducted on a continuous basis and nearly every in 
port period for aircraft carriers is designated as an Intermediate Maintenance Availability 




4. Depot Level Maintenance 
Depot level maintenance is required for maintenance actions that are beyond the 
capability or capacity of organizational and intermediate maintenance levels, and is 
performed by naval shipyards, private shipyards, and item specific depot activities.  
Depot level maintenance for aircraft carriers is normally scheduled during Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) availabilities that vary in complexity and length according to the 
operational schedule and maintenance plan for each ship.  The Type Commander 
(TYCOM) is responsible for the training, material readiness, and equipping of forces for 
the fleet commanders and conducts the screening for jobs to be accomplished by depot 
level activities.  The maintenance actions are tracked by number of man-days to complete 
each job.  Although there are cost data associated with these jobs, man-days are a more 
appropriate predictor since there are different man-day rates for each shipyard which 
complicates normalization of the cost data.  Therefore, maintenance man-days will be 
studied. 
B. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
1. Technical/Operational Sources 
Aircraft carriers were chosen as the platform for study because of the availability 
of their detailed operational schedules and the relatively small number (twelve) of 
maintenance databases that would be analyzed.  The TYCOMs play a major role in the 
maintenance execution for ships including the screening of jobs in the CSMP that are 
approved for accomplishment at the intermediate and depot level.  Commander, Naval 
Air Forces Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) N434 has control of the maintenance 
database for A/C systems of aircraft carriers from which historical data were pulled.  The 
database includes repair and replacement costs for the organizational and intermediate 
levels of maintenance.  For depot level maintenance, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding 
(SUPSHIP) Carrier Planning Office organization provided the data.  For operational data, 
Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) N3 and COMNAVAIRPAC N31 
provided the underway deployed and non-deployed data for the carriers and the days 




2. Budgetary Sources 
The DoN Office of Budget (FMB) coordinates and reviews the Navy’s requests 
for contingency operations funding before submittal to the Undersecretary of Defense 
(Comptroller).  The requests have also been studied and reviewed by the GAO and 
Congressional Research Service analysts.  The various publications put out by FMB and 
GAO were reviewed to ensure the proper justification for incremental costs requests. 
3. Environmental Sources 
The environmental differences between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean 
Sea are key to the justification of incremental costs of operations.  The Naval 
Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) provided the database for differences in water 
temperatures.   Various Internet weather sites provided the geographic temperature 
differences with information being drawn from the U.S. Climatic Data Center in 
Asheville, North Carolina and International Station Meteorological Climate Surveys.  
C. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
1. Review of Regulations and Reports 
Various regulations and reports provide important insight to the difficulties in 
justifying incremental costs for operations.  Several GAO reports provide an external 
view of DoN’s past cost requests and budget methods for contingency operations.  The 
DODFMR has been updated with a chapter specifically for contingency operations 
funding requests.  Various DOD documents including PBD 096 address the strain that 
contingency operations have on our budget plan and execution. 
Regarding ship operations and maintenance, OPNAVINST 4790.4 Ship’s 
Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Manual and 
CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT 4790.3 Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual were reviewed 
to understand the maintenance procedures for ships and the level of oversight that is 
involved in scheduling and approving availabilities and overhauls.  An overview was 
conducted of the various echelons of maintenance activities and their responsibilities in 
maintaining a ship’s material readiness. 
2. Databases  
The TYCOM level database of historical maintenance actions for each aircraft 
carrier in service was a valuable information resource.  It listed all organizational level 
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maintenance and intermediate maintenance conducted for the life of the ship.  The data 
can be pulled by specific EIC to target specific equipment or systems.  The data are in 
both man-hours and cost figures. 
For the ocean environmental data, NAVOCEANO provided access to the Master 
Oceanographic Observation Data Set (MOODS) database, which includes all water 
temperature history as far back as the early 1900’s.  The data were extracted by specific 
date ranges, latitude, longitude and depth. 
3. Interviews 
Actual interviews were key to understanding the maintenance and operational 
procedures for the personnel who actually operate the equipment.  The maintenance 
managers at the TYCOM level also provided an important perspective for the entire 
carrier fleet.  Lastly, the budgetary personnel who are responsible for tracking, 
controlling, or requesting O&M funding for ship’s maintenance were a valuable resource 
for understanding the procedures for planning, justification and execution of this piece of 
the budget. 
D. VARIABLES AFFECTING MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR COSTS 
1. Operational Variables 
a. Ship Age 
Increasing ship age can result in higher maintenance and repair actions.  
Although shipboard preservation is an ongoing process, older ships tend to have more 
preservation problems than newer ships.  The performance of equipment operating in an 
increasingly aging environment will be affected and result in a higher occurrence of 
maintenance problems.  The increase of repairs on older ships results in increased 
maintenance and repair costs.  [Ref. 3, p. 2-6] 
b. Operating Area 
The environmental factors of different operating areas affects the usage 
and assumed level of usage of A/C systems.  The Arabian Gulf has significantly higher 
water and air temperatures than the Mediterranean operating area.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 
show the difference in average monthly water and air temperatures respectively between 
the two regions.  The resulting increase of space temperatures onboard ships causes more 
demand for A/C usage to keep the workspaces and other compartments at a reasonable 
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temperature.  There were also numerous ship alteration maintenance jobs requested to 
add cooling units in compartments that became too hot to comfortably work while 
conducting operations in the Arabian Gulf.  The higher usage of the A/C system and 
increased requests for ship alterations specifically requested because of operations in the 

















































Figure 2.   Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea Average Air Temperature 
 
c. OPTEMPO 
The A/C usage during underway periods is greater than during inport 
periods.  The greater demand on the A/C system is because of the amount of activity 
onboard such as flight operations and the fact that electronic and mechanical equipment 
are in operation twenty-four hours a day.  The increased activity causes temperatures to 
be higher in compartments such as engine rooms, auxiliary machinery spaces, combat 
information center, etc. than during inport periods.  Therefore an increase in OPTEMPO 
will likely increase the frequency of maintenance and repairs needed to keep the plant 
operating effectively. 
E. VARIABLE SEPARATION 
1. Baseline OPTEMPO 
Normal or baseline OPTEMPO is defined as the budgeted OPTEMPO goal of 
underway days per quarter.  Presently, the Navy budget provides funds to execute an 
OPTEMPO goal of 50.5 underway days per quarter for deployed forces and 28 underway 
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days per quarter for non-deployed forces. [Ref. 3, p.2-3]  Any increase over the baseline 
OPTEMPO for deployed days should be considered an incremental cost of operations. 
2. Environmental Factors 
Environmental factors affecting A/C maintenance include seawater and air 
temperatures.  The baseline used for comparison was the Mediterranean Sea operating 
area since this region represents a major area of ongoing deployed operations.  The 
significant difference in environmental factors between the Mediterranean Sea and 
Arabian Gulf should result in different levels of usage and demand on the A/C systems 
onboard ships resulting in an increased level of maintenance and repair costs for 
operations in the Arabian Gulf. 
3. Ship Age 
With the decline in battle force ships to Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
directed levels, the stress of maintaining current OPTEMPO on an aging fleet is evident 
in increased depot maintenance requirements.  The Department’s active ship depot 
maintenance budget finances 97.8% of the notional requirement in FY 2002.  Depot 
maintenance availabilities are increasingly exceeding notional costs. [Ref 3, p. 2-6]  The 
cost trends have proven that as fleet units age, their maintenance costs increase.  The 
incremental costs of A/C maintenance should take into consideration the age of the ships. 
F. GOAL OF VARIABLE SEPARATION 
The goal of defining and separating the variables affecting A/C maintenance and 
repair costs is to define the baseline cost of operations.  Without a baseline of 
maintenance costs, arguments for justifying costs of operations in the Arabian Gulf are 
left to assumption or interpretation.  Establishing an acceptable baseline of A/C 
maintenance in terms of a short list of variables will aid in justifying budget requests for 

































III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Theory 
Regression analysis is a common technique for determining relationships between 
two or more variables.  Regression is perhaps the most widely used quantitative 
technique in business and governmental organizations because of the many issues faced 
by managers involving the extent of one variable’s relationship to another.  [Ref. 18, p.1]  
In cost estimation, the dependent variable is often cost, and in the case of this thesis the 
dependent variable is maintenance hours on A/C systems.  The other variables called 
independent variables or explanatory variables are the subject of the research. 
Simple linear regression involves the analysis of a single explanatory variable’s 
affect on the dependent variable.  The major assumption for simplicity of the model is 
that the relationship is a straight line or linear.  Each independent variable assumed to 
affect A/C maintenance was tested in a simple linear regression model for its statistical 
relevance in explaining maintenance hours. 
Multiple regression involves two or more explanatory variables for predicting the 
behavior of the dependent variable.  Although including more than one variable into the 
regression model can increase the accuracy of the regression model, the addition of 
multiple variables can increase the chance of violating the basic mathematical 
assumptions of regression.  However, there are methods for detecting such violations and 
those tests have been incorporated into the analysis. 
The statistical results from a regression analysis are expressed in terms of R2, f-
statistic, and t-statistic.  R2, the coefficient of determination, measures the percentage of 
variability in the dependent variable Y or maintenance hours that can be explained by the 
regression with a value of 1 being a perfect model.  The f-statistic is used to check the 
statistical significance of R2, with the lower the significance value the better.  The f-
statistic is a statistical check for the entire regression model.  The t-statistic indicates 
whether the independent variables are important in explaining the value of the dependent 
variable.  In a single variable model, the f-statistic and t-statistic are equal.  Choosing 
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acceptable values of each statistical predictor can be subjective, but the combination of 
analyzing all predictors together will determine whether the regression model is valid. 
This thesis utilizes regression analysis to determine a model to explain A/C 
maintenance trends of ships operating in the Arabian Gulf.  Chapter II described several 
variables that would reasonably impact A/C maintenance and these variables are 
considered the explanatory variables with maintenance man-hours as the dependent 
variable for intermediate maintenance and maintenance man-days as the dependent 
variable for depot level maintenance. 
B. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE TREND ANALYSIS 
1. Fiscal Year Analysis 
The first analysis was conducted by looking at each fiscal year for trends.  The 
years under research were from fiscal year (FY) 1996 through FY 2000.  The reason for 
choosing this time period was that the maintenance database for intermediate 
maintenance covered the past ten fiscal years, but the operational underway databases 
began in FY 1996.  Therefore, to study the impact of underway operations on 
maintenance hours, the study was limited to FY 1996 through FY 2000. 
Since intermediate maintenance, in theory, is conducted on a continuous basis, a 
fiscal year analysis seemed a likely starting point.  The single variable regression analysis 
looked at age, deployed OPTEMPO, and days in the Gulf.  The explanatory variable for 
the Gulf was approached both as days in the Gulf and as a temperature factor.  The 
weighted temperature factor was calculated by multiplying the number of days in each 
area of operations (AOR) and weighting the percentage of time in each region by the 
average temperature for the corresponding region.  Tables 1 and 2 show the data used in 
the analysis. 
F Y 96 - F Y 00  IM A  D ata
S h ip S h ip 's A g e  (en d  o f F Y 0 0 ) IM A  M a n  H ou rs T o ta l
C V 6 7 33 1 277 2
C V N 6 8 26 958
C V N 6 9 24 5 0 87
C V N 7 0 19 1 0 48
C V N 7 1 15 5 0 50
C V N 7 3 9 3 4 63  
Table 1.   Regression Data Totals for Ship Age FY96 through FY00 
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Fiscal Year Regression Data
Ship FY IMA Man Hours Days in Gulf Days in Med Temp factor OPTEMPO Age
CV67 FY97 54 0 144 69.57 71.5 30
CV67 FY98 354 0 10 69.57 21 31
CV67 FY00 124 82 30 77.62 63.5 33
CVN69 FY98 109 0 79 69.57 39.5 22
CVN69 FY99 260 20 24 73.8 62 23
CVN69 FY00 798 56 61 74.02 41.3 24
CVN70 FY98 180 12 0 78.87 52 17
CVN70 FY99 636 74 0 78.87 54.5 18
CVN71 FY97 1422 0 106 70.79 46 12
CVN71 FY99 1807 71 75 72.8 48.7 14  
Table 2.   Fiscal Year Regression Model Data 
 
a. Regression Results 
When analyzing the maintenance database for the regression analysis, 
several ships had to be removed from the analysis.  The USS Kitty Hawk (CV63) was 
removed because she is forward deployed and her data for intermediate maintenance 
were considerably higher than any other aircraft carrier. This is to be expected.  The 
majority of her maintenance must be accomplished at the intermediate level since she is 
restricted from depot level availabilities in her increased readiness posture.  The other 
outliers were the USS Constellation (CV64), USS Enterprise (CVN65), USS Abraham 
Lincoln (CVN72), USS John C. Stennis (CVN74), and USS Harry S. Truman (CVN75).  
The reason for their removal was the lack of complete maintenance data at the 
intermediate level.  Additionally CVN75 had not completed a deployment.  The removal 
of the outliers left six carriers in the model, effectively reducing by half the number of 
data points available for the model.  Table 3 shows the outliers removed from the 
regression analysis. 
 FY96 - FY00 IMA Data
Ship Ship's Age (end of FY00) IMA Man Hours Total
CV63 40 21722 
CV64 40 399 
CVN65 40 235 
CVN72 12 118 
CVN74 6 257 
CVN75 3 1636  
Table 3.   Outlying Data Pulled from Regression Model 
Every simple linear regression model using age, OPTEMPO, and number 
of days in the Gulf as explanatory variables resulted in statistically weak models (see 
16 
Figures 3 through 6).  The data plot for each model showed a random pattern with no 
recognizable linear relationship.  Further analysis showed that there appeared to be a time 
lag between deployment and the intermediate maintenance.  The IMAV plot over time for 
USS Enterprise shows evidence of a time lag between the end of deployment and the 
maintenance occurring (see Figure 7).  In theory, intermediate maintenance is a 
continuous process, but in actuality there is a lag between the end of a deployment and 
beginning of the IMAV. 

















IMA Man Hours = -1034.49 + 274.48 X Ship Age
(R2 = .11)
 
Figure 3.   IMA Man Hours vs. Ship Age 
 
17 




















Man Hours = 1037.77 - 9.27 X OPTEMPO
R2 = 0
 
Figure 4.   IMA Man Hours vs. Deployed OPTEMPO 
 




















Man Hours = 181.27 + 8.63 X Days in Gulf
R2 = 0
 
Figure 5.   IMA Man Hours vs. Days in Arabian Gulf 
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Man Hours = 2048.11 - 19.23 X Temperature Factor
R2 = 0
 
Figure 6.   IMA Man Hours vs. Temperature Factor 
 





















Figure 7.   CVN 65 Deployment Timing vs. IMAV Timing 
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It is clear from a statistical point of view that a simple linear regression 
based upon fiscal year totals for underway data and A/C maintenance man-hours is not a 
good predictive model.  Not only were the models poor statistically, but in the case of 
OPTEMPO and temperature factor, the model showed a negative relationship between 
these variables and forecasted maintenance.  The next logical step in the analysis was to 
time-lag the maintenance data back to the respective deployed periods. 
2. Lagged Regression Analysis 
The second model required a more detailed study of ships’ historical schedules 
and maintenance periods.  In many cases, the deployments and maintenance periods 
crossed fiscal years, which created difficulty in selecting a time period to analyze.  The 
time-lag chosen for each ship was based on individual schedules and unique 
circumstances, with the starting period for each time-lag period as the beginning date of a 
deployment.  For example, if a ship entered a major overhaul period following 
deployment it was evident that the intermediate maintenance was deferred to the depot 
level vice the intermediate level.  In such a case, the time period would have to be 
eliminated from the model. 
In most cases, it was clear from the historical schedules when the IMAV would 
start with an average time delay of three to six months.  These delays are normal and are 
caused by SIMA’s lower prioritization of ships returning from deployment and the timing 
of fiscal year O&M funds which grow scarce in the fourth quarter.  Table 4 shows the 
data used for the time lagged regression analysis. 
Lagged IMA Data
Ship Fiscal Year IMA Man Hours Lagged Days In Gulf Days in Med Temp Factor OPTEMPO Age
CV67 FY98 354 0 144 69.57 54.7 31
CV67 FY00 542 82 30 76.38 46.3 33
CVN69 FY98 736 20 103 71.08 47 22
CVN69 FY00 428 56 61 74.02 41.3 24
CVN70 FY97 339 79 0 78.87 50 16
CVN70 FY99 648 80 0 78.87 53.7 18
CVN71 FY98 1704 16 100 70.85 46 13
CVN71 FY00 3050 40 75 72.8 48.7 15  





a. Regression Results 
Age, OPTEMPO, days in the Gulf, and temperature factor were used as 
explanatory variables in single variable regression models.  The regression models were 
limited to eight data points after removal of the outliers.  As in the fiscal year regression 
approach, none of the new models result in any statistical significance.  The regression 
results are shown in Figures 8 through 11. 

















Man Hours = 1653.8 - 41.04 X Ship Age
R2 = .084
 
Figure 8.   Lagged IMA Man Hours vs. Ship Age 
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Man Hours = 1345.34 - 11.95 X Deployed OPTEMPO
R2 = 0
 
Figure 9.   Lagged IMA Man Hours vs. Deployed OPTEMPO 















Man Hours = 1438.68 - 11.51 X Days in Gulf
R2 = .079
 
Figure 10.   Lagged IMA Man Hours vs. Days In Gulf 
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Man Hours = 4739.58 - 53.65 X Temperature Factor
R2 = 0
 
Figure 11.   Lagged IMA Man Hours vs. Temperature Factor 
Lagging the intermediate maintenance man hours back to the deployment 
periods did not result in any improvement in the results of the regression analysis.  The 
above figures do not show any linear pattern to the data which appear to be randomly 
dispersed.  The regression results for deployed OPTEMPO, the number of days in the 
Gulf and temperature factor analyses resulted in a negative trend line which is contrary to 
the assumptions of the research that the hotter climate of the Gulf causes increased 
maintenance on the A/C systems.  The lack of an adequate number of data points in each 
model compounds the error in the analysis.  It is clear from a statistical perspective that 
the four explanatory variables are not adequate predictors for intermediate maintenance 
forecasting. 
C. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE TREND ANALYSIS 
1. Maintenance Timing and Deferral 
The timing of depot level maintenance availabilities must be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the affect of operations on maintenance costs. In many 
cases, maintenance periods are deferred because of scheduling issues with ships and the 
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shipyard availability.  Another reason for maintenance deferment is to delay the funding 
until the next fiscal year because of a shortage in the O&M account.  The deferment 
period will be tailored individually for each ship and must be identified in order to match 
operational periods to their corresponding maintenance availabilities.  The depot 
maintenance time lag is clear, unlike the intermediate maintenance, since the 
availabilities are easily identified in a ship’s historical schedule and the infrequent nature 
of overhauls. Figure 12 shows an example of the timing of depot maintenance for the 
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69).  Since the maintenance availability periods are 
spread out over different time intervals, a correlation must be established between the 
operations of the ship and the resulting maintenance. 
 
Figure 12.   USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69) Historical Depot Maintenance 
 
2. Regression Results 
The explanatory variables used to predict maintenance man-days for depot level 
maintenance on A/C systems were ship age, deployed OPTEMPO, days in the Gulf, and 
temperature factor.  The database for depot level maintenance included information for 
nine aircraft carriers spanning their entire service period.  Because the database for 
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historical underway data was limited to FY 1996 through FY 2000, the number of data 
points for depot level availabilities that matched with underway data available for study 
was reduced to six.  The carriers included in the models were USS Enterprise (CVN65), 
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN69), USS Carl Vinson (CVN70), USS Abraham 
Lincoln (CVN72), and USS John C. Stennis (CVN74).  As in the intermediate level 
analysis, the lack of data points will reduce the statistical relevance of each model.  Table 
5 shows the data used in the regression model. 
Depot Level Regression Data
Ship Period Depot Level Man Days Days in Gulf Temp Factor OPTEMPO Age
CVN65 FY 96/97 96 60 73.93 45.3 37
CVN69 FY 98/99 120 20 71.08 47.0 22
CVN70 FY 96/97 6176 79 78.87 50.0 16
CVN70 FY 99/00 5304 80 78.87 53.7 18
CVN72 FY 95/96 1808 76 78.87 46.7 8
CVN74 FY 98/99 1440 107 78.53 49.7 4  
Table 5.   Depot Level Regression Data 
 
The results of the four single variable regression models are shown in Figures 13 
through 16.  For the models predicting the effect of ship age, days in the Gulf and 
temperature factor variables, the results are statistically insignificant.  In each case, the 
data dispersion was random and showed no linear relationship.  For the deployed 
OPTEMPO independent variable, the model proved to be statistically significant.  
However, since the environmental variables of days in the Gulf and temperature factor 
were poor predictors of maintenance man-days, running a multi-variable model with 
deployed OPTEMPO and either environmental variable proved to be statistically 
insignificant.  The poor results for the multi-variable model were expected since the 
single variable models with days in the Gulf and temperature factor were found to be 
poor explanatory variables. 
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Man Days = 3548.08 - 60.42 X Ship Age
R2 = 0
 
Figure 13.   Depot Level Man Days vs. Ship Age 
 

















Man Days = -211.71 + 38.42 X Days In Gulf
R2 = 0
 
Figure 14.   Depot Level Man Days vs. Days in Gulf 
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Man Days = -38939.34 + 540.21 X Temperature Factor
R2 = .35
 
Figure 15.   Depot Level Man Days vs. Temperature Factor 

















Man Days = -30620.11 + 679.43 X Deployed OPTEMPO
R2 = .52
 
Figure 16.   Depot Level Man Days vs. Deployed OPTEMPO 
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Although the time lag for depot level maintenance data was obvious in relation to 
a completed deployment cycle, only one variable showed a statistically significant 
relationship for predicting future maintenance.  The variables relating the environmental 


































IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
PBD 096 has changed the way the DoN budgets for Arabian Gulf operations.  The 
cost of operations in the Arabian Gulf is now required to be submitted as part of the 
DoN’s annual budget.  In order to justify increased incremental costs for operations in the 
Gulf, we must present a defendable argument, such as a valid regression model, to defend 
the budget requests.  The severe environmental factors of the Gulf seemed to be an 
obvious research topic to predict incremental costs over other AORs such as the 
Mediterranean Sea.  However, using maintenance trends and environmental variables for 
ships operating the Gulf has not proven to be the right approach for justification of 
increased costs associated with Gulf operations, at least for the ships chosen for this 
study. 
The maintenance data available for analysis proved to have significant 
inconsistencies.  The number of outliers that had to be removed from the analysis greatly 
affected the statistical significance of the regression model developed.  Although the 
maintenance database had historical data for FY 1990 through FY 2000, the research was 
limited by the available operational data, which was for the period FY 1996 through FY 
2000.  The restricted time period caused only six data points to be available for the depot 
level maintenance analysis which also greatly degraded the statistical relevance of the 
depot level regression model.  By reducing the amount of data available for inclusion as 
the dependent variable the amount of error in the regression analysis was compounded.  
The CSMP database is maintained by ships force personnel, and based on past personal 
experience of duty at sea, there were likely widespread inconsistencies in maintaining an 
accurate maintenance picture based upon the human factor of inputting man hours spent 
working each job. 
As far as independent variables are concerned, only deployed OPTEMPO showed 
any statistical relevance in the depot level model.  Not one of the explanatory variables 
proved to be significant in the intermediate level analysis.  In addition, the temperature 
factor variable should not be used as independent variable for future research models.  
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The temperature factor variable does not have a large enough range, i.e., the data are too 
tightly grouped to be a valid independent variable in the model.  The reason is that the 
smaller the range of a variable, the smaller the prediction range the variable can be used 
for.  In other words, it is mathematically inappropriate to forecast values that lie outside 
the range of your independent variables.  Since the range is limited, the forecast model is 
also limited with its ability to accurately predict future maintenance. 
Surprisingly, age also proved to be an insignificant explanatory variable for 
maintenance costs of A/C systems.  The most appropriate explanation is that the timing 
of A/C systems replacement is based on usage vice age of the platform.  The variable 
days in the Gulf was assumed to have a temperature factor built in.  However, the random 
spread of maintenance costs in relation to this variable showed no significance in either 
model. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis was based upon the assumption that the severe environmental 
variables of the Arabian Gulf would affect maintenance costs for A/C systems since they 
are directly affected by the seawater temperatures and ambient air temperatures of the 
operational area.  However, the regression models could not prove this assumption to be 
true. 
Selecting A/C systems is most likely a valid target for proving there are 
incremental affects of the Arabian Gulf on our equipment, but maintenance costs is not 
the proper dependent variable to choose.  Future research could be directed at historical 
A/C system usage for ships that operate in the Gulf versus the Mediterranean AOR.   
While deployed on USS Chancellorsville (CG62) to the Arabian Gulf in the 
summer of 1995, the author noticed a constant battle against the heat inside the ship.  It 
was common to have all three A/C plants in operation during the hottest time of the day.  
Conversely, on a second deployment on CG62 in support of Counter Drug Operations off 
the coast of Colombia in the Eastern Pacific, the engineers never had to bring all three 
A/C plants online at the same time.  In fact, it was rare to have more than one A/C plant 
in operation at any given time.  However, the study shows that the impact of increased 
use of A/C plants on maintenance man hours kept on official ship records is not clear.  
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Therefore, conducting an analysis of plant total hourly usage for operations in the Gulf 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
3M     Maintenance and Material Management System 
A/C    Air Conditioning 
AOR    Area of Operations 
C4I    Command Control Communications Computer and  
Intelligence 
CINCLANTFLT  Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet 
CINCPACFLT  Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 
COMNAVAIRPAC  Commander, Naval Air Forces, Pacific 
CNO    Chief of Naval Operations 
CSMP    Current Ship’s Maintenance Project 
DOD    Department of Defense 
DODFMR   Department of Defense Financial Management 
Regulation 
DoN    Department of the Navy 
EIC    Equipment Identification Code 
FCU    Fan Coil Unit 
FMB    Office of Budget (Navy) 
GAO    General Accounting Office 
IMA    Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
IMAV    Intermediate Maintenance Availability 
MOODS   Master Oceanographic Observation Data Set 
NAVOCEANO  Naval Oceanographic Office 
NIMA    Navy Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
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O&M    Operations and Maintenance 
OCOTF   Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund 
OPNAVINST   Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
OPTEMPO    Operational Tempo 
PBD    Program Budget Decision 
PMS    Preventive Maintenance System 
SIMA    Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
SUPSHIP   Supervisor of Shipbuilding 
TYCOM   Type Commander 
QDR    Quadrennial Defense Review 
UN    United Nations 
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